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Abstract
The deregulation of the United States airline industry in the late 1970s has resulted in
lower ticket prices and increased productivity1, but deregulation has also created an oligopolistic
domestic airline market with high barriers to entry that has obstructed competition. This present
lack of competition in the industry has reduced social welfare. I will argue that engaging in
cabotage and allowing foreign investments will create a monopolistically competitive
environment that will enhance competition and social welfare in the United States airline market.
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I. Introduction
There have been a number of benefits from deregulating the airline industry, but the lack
of regulation has led the airlines still in operation after the deregulation era to exhibit cartel
behavior and engage in predatory behavior. These practices prohibit successful entry of more
efficient domestic carriers and reduces the market’s social welfare. These inefficiencies can be
improved by allowing foreign investment and foreign competition in the United States domestic
airline market.
Cabotage is the carriage of air traffic that originates and terminates in the boundaries of a
country by an air carrier of another country.2 Foreign competition will increase competition in
the U.S. airline industry. Cabotage will lead to an exit of inefficient U.S. flag carriers and
promote the entry of efficient carriers. This will create a monopolistically competitive market,
which will allow consumers to enjoy lower fares and differentiated services. Opening up the U.S.
airline industry to international competition is a struggle due to government barriers, barriers
created by airlines, infrastructure, and globalization fears. I will argue that international
competition and foreign investment will create a monopolistically competitive environment that
will improve competition and reduce the market’s welfare loss. I will also suggest reforms that
will promote international competition in the U.S. airline industry.
The next section will provide a brief history on the deregulation of the United States
airline industry that will help in understanding the market that presently exists. In the third
section, I will explain the barriers to entry associated with the present day oligopolistic domestic
airline market and the ensuing market failure that is hurting social welfare. Section IV will
present other methods that U.S. flag carriers have been utilizing in order to prevent competition.
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Section V will give a brief background to industry cabotage, relationships that domestic carriers
presently have with international carriers, industry investment policies, and how allowing foreign
investment and the entry of international carriers can be used as a solution to dissolve the airline
oligopoly and increase competition in the U.S. airline market. A monopolistically competitive
model will be utilized to illustrate the benefits from engaging in cabotage. Section VI will
discuss the impediments that prevent cabotage from existing in the U.S. airline industry and
section VII prescribes solutions for reducing these barriers. Lastly, I will provide concluding
remarks.
II. Airline Deregulation History
Before the 1978 United States Airline Deregulation Act, the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) was the economic regulatory body for airlines that controlled airline schedules, fares, and
routes, which essentially allowed U.S. airlines to exercise monopoly power.3 In 1975, the CAB’s
Special Staff did a self-study of the organization and concluded that the amending federal law to
eliminate “protective entry, exit, and price control” would be beneficial for the airline market.4
These inquiries produced by the CAB’s staff and independent economists caused Congress to
consider the issue. In 1977, the Jimmy Carter administration appointed Alfred Kahn as the
chairperson of the CAB. He is well known in the industry as the father of airline deregulation.5
Kahn was able to assemble a group of talented young economists with strong pro-competitive
views that produced research and testified in favor of airline deregulation before Congress.6 As a
result, both sides of the political spectrum agreed that CAB promoted an anti-consumer and anti-
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competitive atmosphere in the airline industry, which spurred the call for deregulation within the
U.S. domestic airline industry.7 Economists should be credited for the role they played in the
creation of the Airline Deregulation Act. Deregulation was a success and led to lower consumer
fares and better quality service according to Kahn. This was due to the fact that the dissolution of
the CAB in 1984 temporarily forced carriers to operate in a competitive manner.
Legacy carriers, also known as the Big Six, which had a large presence in the industry
before deregulation and survived through the deregulation era through consolidations, include
United Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, Continental Airlines,
and US Airways.8 These carriers were able to stay in service while many airlines shutdown after
deregulation. With more control over their schedules, fares, and destinations, the legacy carriers
developed the hub-and-spoke system where the airline would choose a hub, which is a central
airport that flights are routed through, and spokes, the routes out the hub.9 This model essentially
allows carriers to fly smaller airplanes to their spokes and larger planes to the hub,10 which
enables airlines to serve routes with lower demand and to have fuller airplane loads. The huband-spoke system increases productivity and efficiency and lowers per passenger costs in
comparison to the old point-to-point system where airlines directly fly between two destinations.
Research proved that the new model increased flight destinations and lowered fares dramatically
after deregulation, which was favorable for consumers.11 Despite this innovation, other
deficiencies developed and still presently exist in the U.S. airline market that hurt domestic
travelers.
7
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After the CAB was dissolved, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) became the
regulatory authority over the airline industry and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) was
given the responsibility to handle antitrust activity within the industry.12 The U.S. DOJ analyzes
mergers and other anti-competitive situations on a case-by-case basis by determining whether the
practiced behavior or proposed airline merger substantially decreases competition.13 Although
these agencies are currently put in charge of protecting the consumer from anti-competitive
behavior, they have not been effective in preventing carriers from engaging in oligopolistic and
predatory behavior.
III. Market Failure
Even though consumers have benefited directly from deregulation, anti-competitive
behavior can emerge and hurt social welfare in any unregulated industry. Starting in the late
1980s, the beneficial results from deregulation were unraveled.14 The Department of Justice
conducted studies from 1985 to 1988 that proved airlines in concentrated markets were able to
price above their costs.15 Also in 1985, research done by former airline executives suggested that
the deregulated airline industry had developed into a mature oligopoly where price leaders set
prices and the rest of the industry followed.16 Thus, the airline industry and its few standing
competitors developed into an oligopolistic market that practices conscious parallelism pricing.17
Conscious parallelism pricing is an oligopolistic pricing structure where competitors price their
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products or services similar to others in the industry rather than pricing at marginal cost.18 In
turn, the industry’s oligopolistic behavior causes a market failure.
This pricing scheme is a form of tacit collusion where firms in a cartel agree to a certain
strategy without an explicit agreement. When producers in a oligopoly notice that the price and
output strategy of one firm creates a significant impact on other firms in the industry, they begin
to coordinate their behavior and practice conscious parallelism pricing. Thus, with evidence of
conscious parallelism, it can be argued that the U.S. airline industry is once again operating as a
cartel. Figure 1 illustrates consumer and producer welfare and the deadweight loss suffered from
the airline industry engaging in a cartel versus in a perfectly competitive environment.
Figure 1.
P: Price
Q: Quantity
MC: Marginal Cost
MR: Marginal Revenue
D: Demand

In order to simplify, we will assume that
the marginal cost of airlines is horizontal.
This means that costs are constant because
there will be no additional costs to an
airline to provide services up to a certain
quantity where costs ultimately become
infinite due to airplane capacity limitations.
 PC and QC is where the cartel is
producing
 P* and Q* is where the firms would
produce if in a perfectly competitive
environment
Consumer welfare = A
Producer welfare = B
Deadweight loss = C

Operating as a cartel has not been the only attempt by legacy airlines to keep competitors out of
the industry.

18
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IV. Preventing Competition in the Industry
4.1 Legacy Airlines’ Predatory Practices and Advantages
Aside from collusion, evidence suggests that legacy carriers have also engaged in
predatory actions in order to drive away competition.19 George Yip (1982) who specializes in
global strategy and marketing noted incumbent firms’ reactions to entrants can create strategic
entry barriers. An example of this can be found between Northwest Airlines and Reno Air. Reno
Air announced in 1993 that it would begin nonstop flights from Reno to Minneapolis and the
next day Northwest made the same announcement.20 Shortly after, Northwest also announced
that it would begin services from Reno to Seattle, Los Angeles, and San Diego which were
routes also flown by Reno Air. Ironically, Northwest soon began matching Reno Air’s fares.21
Northwest’s action is one example of how incumbent airlines deter competition in the market.
Incumbent airlines have reacted in a number of predatory ways towards new entrants. Predatory
actions include starting nonunion, low cost subsidiary airlines to compete and predatory pricing
by temporarily significantly lowering fares to drive away a competitor.22 Oster and Strong’s
study for the DOT on predatory behavior in the airline industry discovered that when new
entrants left the market due to predatory pressures, the revenue of the predator airline increased
significantly within a period of time which made up for the loss from temporarily lowering fares.
Despite this research that was sponsored by the U.S. DOT, these airlines are left unpunished for
their behavior. As a result, this known predatory behavior that persists in the industry will deter
entry into the market. These strategic barriers created by incumbent airlines and other structural
barriers make it difficult for startup airlines to enter the market.
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The industry requires high initial fixed costs to start an airline company23 and in general,
airlines operate at a low profit margin.24 Additionally, incumbent carriers have great advantages
over new entrants. They have monopolies over airport gates and slots25 and huge economies of
scale due to their hub and spoke strategies.26 Legacy carriers also have plenty of market power
that they can exercise to their advantage. Many U.S. carriers offer services to reward loyal
customers such as frequent flier programs where travelers can earn air miles toward free travel or
cabin upgrades.27 Some airlines engage in frequent flier program alliances that allow travelers to
earn miles when traveling with an ally carrier. They also code share flights where a flight
operated by an airline is marked as a flight for at least one other airline and passengers on the
flight can earn frequent flier miles for each marked airline. This permits airlines to extend their
services to cities that they do not serve and earn revenue through offering seats on a partner’s
flight.28 While these advantages serve as significant barriers, a few low-cost airlines have
successfully entered the market.
4.2 Domestic Competition and Traditional Carriers’ Inefficient Industry Practices
Airlines that have been able to compete with legacy carriers, for example Southwest
Airlines and JetBlue Airways, use innovative strategies such as serving smaller markets using the
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point-to-point system, which have greatly benefited consumers.29 Southwest and JetBlue belong
to a new trend of airlines known as low-cost carriers. Low-cost carriers have significant
advantages over traditional air carriers due to their lower input costs and cheaper product and
process design which are then strategically targeted toward a segment of the market.30 The
entries of these carriers are success stories that prove competition gives consumers more flight
choices and lower fares, and pressure inefficient carriers to leave the industry or lower their
costs.
All legacy carriers, with the exception of American Airlines, have filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy and are all still presently in operation.31 These same carriers are operating as a cartel
and filing for bankruptcy at the same time is a paradox. This is due to the fact that legacy carriers
have very high input costs and the most significant cost that they bear comes from labor.32 Lowcost carriers have been able to keep costs approximately twenty percent below those of
traditional carriers, and they pay their pilots and other employee groups lower wages in
comparison to traditional airlines sometimes up to forty percent less.33 These high cost unionized
airlines are a result of the pre-deregulation era.34 Labor salaries and benefits are the first to be
renegotiated with unions when an airline is in financial distress.35 This would suggest that
revenue gained from oligopolistic activities are being shared with airline laborers, which is
similar to how carriers operated before deregulation when they were benefiting from an anti-
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competitive environment created by the CAB.36 Although deregulation was beneficial for the
industry’s consumers, unions and associated high labor costs are a prominent issue that still
exists.
Economic inefficiency theories can help explain high labor costs of legacy airlines. The
creator of the X-inefficiency theory, Harvey Leibenstein, defines it as when “a given set of
inputs do not get to be combined in such a way so as to lead to maximum output.”37 Legacy
carriers paying exorbitant wages cause the non-maximization of output. X-inefficiency also
usually occurs when there is a lack of competition within an industry, which explains why there
was generous labor compensation before industry deregulation. High labor costs are also a form
of allocative inefficiency that occurs when the value that consumers place on a good or service is
not equal to the costs of resources used to produce the good or service. Additionally, productive
inefficiency occurs when the good or service can be produced at lower costs which is
exemplified in this situation through low-cost carriers’ labor costs. Having high costs causes
legacy carriers to operate inefficiently, resulting in constant bankruptcy pressures.
Stemming from bankruptcy, many proposed airline mergers have been submitted to the
U.S. DOJ. Since 9/11, there have been several negotiations amongst airlines regarding mergers,
which will help these bankrupt firms stay in business. As mentioned before, the DOJ handles
mergers on a case-by-case basis by analyzing if the amount of market share gained through a
merger would reduce competition.38 It is inefficient to keep these airlines in business using
mergers because I will assert that newly merged conglomerates will keep operating in a cartel
because prior business practices will be continued and the gain in market power will allow the
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airline to continue shutting out competitors. In 2000, travelers would have been twenty billion
dollars worse off if Southwest Airlines did not exist at all, and consumers would have been better
off if U.S. Airways had left the industry to make room for more efficient carriers.39 Therefore,
there is potential for much more competition within the U.S. airline industry that will be
beneficial for consumers and improve social welfare in the current market. The next section will
explore how competition in the industry can be improved through engaging in cabotage.
V. Increasing Competition in the Industry
5.1 Background of Cabotage
The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation in 1944 brought together fiftytwo nations in attempt to negotiate a multilateral agreement on liberalizing the international
airline market and air travel.40 During the convention, the nations drafted up eight “Freedoms of
the Skies” but only the first five freedoms were agreed upon by some nations.41 In 1979, the U.S.
heavily pursued “Open Skies” agreements and since then many bilateral agreements have been
signed with other countries.42 “Open Skies” agreements are bilateral or multilateral agreements
between countries that negotiate air transportation routes, capacity, pricing, and other aviation
activities.43 Unfortunately, these agreements do not go far enough to increase international
competition within the United States domestic airline industry. The final “Freedom of the Sky”
associated with cabotage44 has yet to be negotiated by the United States with any other country.
According to J. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust
39
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Department of the U.S. Department of Justice, a change to permit cabotage will not happen
anytime in the near future.45 This is discouraging due to the possible benefits that can be gained
from partaking in cabotage.
For simplicity, we will focus specifically on the U.S. engaging in unilateral cabotage
where foreign airlines are allowed to operate in the U.S. and we will examine the resulting
effects that would occur within the U.S. airline market. Engaging in cabotage would mean that,
for example, a carrier from the United Kingdom such as British Airways would be able to fly
passengers from Washington Dulles International Airport to Chicago’s O’Hare International
Airport.46 As U.S. regulations stand now, British Airways would be able to fly from the U.K. to
Dulles and then to O’Hare but the airplane would not be allowed to pick up passengers from
Dulles. Obviously, if half of the passengers wanted to deplane in Dulles then it would not be
economically reasonable to fly a half-empty plane to O’Hare. The airline would be better off
making all passengers disembark in Dulles. This example illustrates how there is potential for
foreign carriers to serve the U.S. domestic market. Foreign carriers are allowed to pickup and
carry passengers within the U.S. only if authorized by the Department of Transportation and only
when an emergency or unique circumstance arises.47 The inability to serve U.S. domestic routes
has forced foreign carriers to engage in alliances with U.S. flag carriers.
5.2 Relationships with International Carriers
Alliances have been recently utilized by domestic and foreign airlines in order to operate
more efficiently and profitably.48 The DOT’s Office of International Aviation has the
responsibility to approve alliances and the ability to grant antitrust immunity to alliances
45
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involving foreign carriers. Alliances were at first used to help smaller airlines compete with
foreign carriers on international routes but now the focus has turned to creating international
alliances to compete with one another.49 These international alliances have impeded competitive
behavior that would benefit consumers. When Northwest and KLM were granted antitrust
immunity after the U.S. and the Netherlands negotiated an “Open Skies” agreement, the number
of flights between the U.S. and the Netherlands decreased,50 which reduced consumer flight
choices. United Airlines and Canada Air’s partnership through the Star Alliance51 also
demonstrates diminished competition. Both airlines used to compete on the San Francisco and
Toronto route until they began code sharing their flights.52 Immunity grants allow the airlines to
cartelize international routes. If domestic carriers faced competition from international carriers
from reciprocal cabotage where cabotage is granted between two nations or unions, carriers
would be in direct competition with one another. Absent immunity that fosters a cartel in the
industry, airlines would be forced to compete domestically and internationally with all other
carriers.53 Beside alliances, there are many laws that exist to keep air transportation cabotage out
of the U.S.
5.3 Domestic Ownership Laws
The United States caps the percentage of foreign ownership in U.S. airlines, which
inherently keeps U.S. flag carriers American owned. The current cap is at forty-nine percent of
equity and twenty-five percent of voting shares.54 This essentially prohibits total foreign
ownership. Ironically, foreign investments have been an alternative source that has saved legacy
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carriers from going into financial distress. In 1989, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines saved Northwest
from going into bankruptcy and British Airways acquired forty-four percent of equity holdings
of U.S. Airways, which helped with that airline’s financial problems in 1993.55 The restrictions
on foreign ownership give struggling and emerging airlines less access to much needed foreign
capital.
5.4 Permitting Cabotage in the U.S. Airline Industry
A number of frustrations have stemmed from the prohibition of cabotage and foreign
ownership. For instance, Sir Richard Branson, the founder of the popular U.K. Virgin brand,
stated, “It is really a ludicrous situation. When I open a Virgin Megastore in New York, I am
welcomed with open arms, just as Tower Records is in London. But try to operate an air service
between New York and Boston, using U.S. aircraft and U.S. crew, and governments scream that
I am mad!”56 Interestingly enough, Branson has been able to successfully startup the low-cost
carrier Virgin America, which has been operating since August 2007.57 He had to raise funds in
the United States in order to account for the fifty-one percent domestic ownership rule. The
Virgin Group provided the remaining forty-nine percent, which is approximately $88.4 million.58
The airline had to go through an eighteen-month investigation by the U.S. DOT because of its
ties with Richard Branson.59 Despite this victorious startup, many interested foreign carriers and
entrepreneurs do not have the means and connections to make this a reality because of airline
ownership barriers in the United States. Virgin America’s success is yet to be determined but
Richard Branson’s expertise in opening airlines under the Virgin Group and market entry
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strategy effectively enabled him to enter into the U.S. airline industry. George Yip claims that
firms already established in other industries will have an easier time entering a new market
because of transferable resources and skills.60 The Virgin Group serves as a great example of
this. Thus, existing firms in foreign countries will have the knowledge and ability to enter the
U.S. airline market and serve as capable competitors for U.S. carriers and a reduction in
deadweight loss, lower prices, and more consumers choices will occur in the market.
According to Yip’s Barriers to Entry, a new entrant with existing skills and resources
within an industry can reduce barriers to entry, which is extremely important for the entrants of
the U.S. airline industry as previous evidence suggests.61 These types of entrants will have the
ability to negate entry barriers and competitively position themselves in the U.S. airline market.62
The entrant will have better knowledge of profit opportunities than a new startup firm, so more
established foreign air carriers would have the ability and means to compete with legacy U.S.
flag carriers. Foreign competitors will also have a different and perhaps more effective
competitive strategy than incumbent firms like in the Southwest and JetBlue cases.63 Moreover,
allowing foreign competitors to enter the market can promote superior management practices
designed to reduce managerial inefficiencies that currently exist.64 Entry also implies greater
product differentiation, which provides consumers with more choices in fares, flight times, and
services. The past has shown that consumers have benefited from allowing foreign competition
to enter other markets such as in the automobile and steel industry.65 Allowing cabotage and
having fewer restrictions on foreign ownership will lead to increased competition. Competition
60
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from foreign competitors will reduce the oligopolistic market power of U.S. carriers. Pressures
from other competitors will cause domestic airlines to start charging at marginal cost rather than
continuing to practice conscious parallelism.66 When international competitors enter the market,
it will drive out inefficient carriers leaving only efficient carriers to serve the market. I will
suggest that the airline market will turn into a monopolistically competitive market if the U.S.
were to allow cabotage.
Monopolistically competitive markets can be characterized by free entry and exit, many
producers and consumers, and heterogeneous goods and services. This is almost similar to a
perfectly competitive market but producers in monopolistic competition try to differentiate their
products. We can assume that the products and services offered in an internationally competitive
U.S. domestic airline market would be differentiated due to marketing. Although a
monopolistically competitive firm with a successful product will be able to operate with an
economic profit in the short-run, these profits do not last in the long-run. These economic profits
will induce entry into the market and create competition. In the long-run, the overall demand for
a firm’s product will diminish as competition increases. Due to entry, the firm’s demand curve
will make a leftward shift until the firm’s average cost curve and its demand curve are tangent
and there is no economic profit made. This kind of market is considerably different in
comparison to a cartel environment because there is free exit and entry and firms must
differentiate their goods and services in order to be competitive.
On the following page, Figure Two illustrates the deadweight loss incurred by a single
firm operating in a cartel versus in monopolistic competition. In a cartel, a single firm would
charge the price PC and produce at QC, which is its production quota and set price given by the
cartel. The deadweight loss is captured by the area A+B because the firm would be producing at
66
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P* and Q* in a perfectly competitive environment. In a monopolistically competitive market, the
firm’s demand curve has shifted to become tangent to the average total cost curve. The firm’s
demand and marginal revenue curve shift to become more elastic as entry occurs in the market
due to profit incentives. The deadweight loss in this instance is area B because the firm in this
scenario should be producing where marginal cost is equal to demand or marginal benefit. The
deadweight loss is significantly greater when the firm is operating in a cartel. Additionally, when
comparing prices, the price set by the cartel is higher than the monopolistic competition price at
PMC and essentially, this increases consumer surplus. Therefore, in a monopolistically
competitive market, prices will be lower, consumer surplus will increase, and deadweight loss
will decrease. In the long-run sense, a monopolistically competitive domestic airline industry can
be considered desirable.

19
Figure 2.

The same conditions still hold in the airline
cartel as in Figure 1.
P: Price
Q: Quantity
MC: Marginal Cost
D: Demand
MR: Marginal Revenue
ATC: Average Total Cost

For simplicity and comparison purposes, we will assume
that the production quota given to this firm is QC at PC and
the firm’s demand curve will shift in this manner in a
monopolistically competitive environment. Therefore, the
firm’s output in a cartel would be the same in monopolistic
competition.
When examining the deadweight loss of the single firm
operating in a cartel, do not pay particular attention to the
shifted demand and marginal revenue curve as this
becomes important only when examining deadweight loss
in monopolistic competition.
Deadweight loss operating the in cartel = A+B
Deadweight loss in monopolistic competition = B

In attempts to stay profitable, firms in monopolistic competition will try to attract more
consumers through product innovation and reduce costs through process innovation. Producers
will innovate to the degree that marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of innovating. Product
innovation will mean more product differentiation by firms to attract more consumers. This can
be established through the use of advertising to try to produce a respected brand identity. For
example, Southwest is well known for its cheap fares and lively flight attendants. This can mean
that airlines will differentiate by becoming known as the airline with the most on-time flights,
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most comfortable seats, best customer service, most direct flights, etc. Process innovation
through practices such as better management strategies, lowering input costs, and better route
strategies will lead to lower costs for the firm. These beneficial results from a monopolistically
competitive market can certainly help enhance efficiency in the United States domestic airline
industry.
VI. Barriers to Cabotage and Foreign Investments
The first most obvious obstacle for foreign carriers to enter the domestic U.S. market, as
mentioned before, is U.S. law. The U.S. government has been accused of hypocrisy where it has
been practicing unfair protectionist policies to protect domestic firms while encouraging other
countries to engage in open market policies.67 Another impediment is the ability the U.S.
government has to commandeer U.S. commercial airplanes for national emergencies. In
exchange, the government has allowed U.S. carriers to be the official carriers for the government
which means that the U.S. government will only use U.S. airlines. 68 While national security is an
important issue, negotiations can still be made with U.S. flag carriers that would still be in
operation under cabotage. Political influence also plays a large role in the continued existence of
legacy carriers. Legacy airlines and the Air Transport Association have significant lobbying
power in Congress where millions of dollars are spent each year on lobbying to protect their
market power.69 This eliminates incentive for government representatives to change laws that
will progressively allow foreign entry and investment in order to protect domestic firms.
The next challenging aspect of the U.S. air transportation industry is airport management
and infrastructures. The monopoly that incumbent carriers have over airport takeoff, landing
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slots and terminal space that were grandfathered to legacy airlines after deregulation in 198570
has been a major barrier for domestic startup carriers. U.S. airports are generally owned by the
public and operated by the local government. Most U.S. airports are publicly owned because
there are significant sunk costs in the construction of an airport. If an airport fails, losses cannot
be easily recouped. The problems associated with public ownership arise from the influence of
incumbent airlines. Existing U.S. carriers have made arrangements to help airports payoff their
bonds. They also have voting rights on airport boards, which many have used to their advantage
through engaging in activities such as voting in opposition of airport expansion to hinder
competition.71 Airports have little opportunity to attract additional carriers because of
relationships already established with incumbent airlines.72 In addition, increased competition
will ultimately result in increased air traffic so it is hard to predict whether the existing
infrastructures would be capable of handling the increased traffic that will result from cabotage
and foreign investment.
Another prominent barrier to cabotage is security. After 9/11, worldwide safety and
security fears from terrorism became an imperative issue that resulted in new security standards
for air travel all over the world. While there are legitimate safety and security reasons to be
concerned, they can only be resolved if adequate security and safety standards are set in place.
Lastly, globalization has been a growing controversial phenomenon in the twenty-first
century that has become a controversial issue. Allowing cabotage and foreign investments will
ultimately further promote globalization. Fears of lost jobs, profits going offshore, poor quality
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services, and greater inequality are all negatively associated with globalization.73 There is the
perception that globalization harms the public interest, which is why protectionist policies exist.
However, there are positive aspects to globalization as well. In this new technology age,
globalization is something that cannot be easily stopped because profit-seeking firms will choose
business strategies that leave them in a better position against their competitors.74 We can
already see this happening in the airline industry with customer service calling centers that are
outsourced to nations such as India and the Philippines.75 In this instance, we see that
globalization allows firms to lower costs by using more lower cost resources. In order to make
air transportation cabotage a reality, there have to be reforms made to breakdown these barriers
and a change in protectionist practices employed by the United States.
VII. Recommended Reforms
First of all, there has to be an elimination of the foreign investment cap in order to foster
an internationally competitive environment in the United States domestic airline industry. This
will allow airlines to have more access to capital and make it easier for foreign entrepreneurs to
compete in the U.S. market in contrast to the Virgin Atlantic case. To fully engage in cabotage,
the U.S. will have to negotiate “Open Skies” agreements concerning the last “Freedom of the
Sky.” Eliminating antitrust immunity for international airline alliances will also be necessary.
Otherwise, airlines could potentially operate in a worldwide cartel. Additionally, the U.S. DOJ
could aggressively punish firms that engage in predatory activities even though predatory
activities can sometimes be hard to prove. These actions will reduce the oligopolistic nature of
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the U.S. airline market and promote competition. In order for these actions to occur, Congress
must not be swayed by pressure from legacy airlines and fairly consider the issue at stake. I
would recommend conducting further economic research on allowing foreign investment and
cabotage in the U.S. airline industry and gathering testimonies from notable economists as in the
1970s when Congress was considering deregulating the industry.
Changing the way that airports operate will also be necessary to promote competition.
Removing airlines from airport boards and restricting airline investment in airports can be
solutions that will cause airports to compete for airline carriers, which will release the monopoly
control of gates and slots by incumbent airlines. In order to redistribute slots and gates fairly, an
auction can be utilized. Airlines that value the slots and gates the most would be willing to pay
the most in the auction. This will eliminate the control that incumbent airlines enjoy. Although
airport space is an issue, it is not a severe issue. Only four United States airports are slotconstrained; they are Chicago O’Hare International, Ronald Reagan Washington International,
and New York’s JFK International and LaGuardia.76 Increased air traffic that comes with more
competition and demand will spur a need for the Federal Aviation Administration to invest in air
traffic control systems that are capable of handling the potential traffic. Infrastructure and the air
transportation market will ultimately have to adjust to increased demand and competition.
Safety and security concerns are important in commercial travel. All airlines operating
within the U.S. will have to abide by U.S. regulations as they do now. To keep standards
consistent worldwide, it would be beneficial to implement international safety standards through
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an organization such as the International Air Transport Association to which almost all airlines
belong.77 Consistent standards would promote a safe air travel environment globally.
The acceptance of globalization and the elimination of protectionism will require a
change in perception, which is not easy. The benefits from globalization can be sometimes
overlooked due to emphasis put on its negative aspects. There are a number of examples from
the past that demonstrate that allowing foreign competition is beneficial. The entrance of Toyota,
a Japanese automobile manufacturer, into the U.S.’s automotive industry created more
automobile choices for U.S. consumers at lower prices and Toyota’s U.S. manufacturing
facilities created jobs for Americans.78 This resulted in an increase in U.S. Gross Domestic
Product and even benefited the national economy. As indicated by Richard Branson, negotiations
can be made by foreign airline entrants to agree on deals such as employing only U.S. employees
and pilots.79 In the future, firms will continue to feel competitive pressures from globalization.
Nonetheless, the benefits from increased competition such as more consumer choices, lower
prices, and enhanced social welfare in the market should not be disregarded.
VIII. Conclusion
The oligopolistic airline market that exists and other barriers such as laws, infrastructure,
and perceptions will continue to act as barriers for new airline entrants. Even though breaking
down these barriers is not a simple and the process would be slow, there must be progressive
action taken to implement the suggested reforms in order for this to occur. Further research
should be promoted on air transportation cabotage and cost-benefit analyses should be pursued.
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Recent developments of cabotage such as the agreements made within the European Union and
between Singapore and the United Kingdom80 should also be studied once data is available.
Potential lessons should be developed from these studies for applications in other countries.
Although cabotage and allowing foreign investment into the U.S. domestic airline market cannot
create perfect competition, it will help create a market environment where social welfare is
enhanced, there are more flight service choices, and there are lower fares for consumers in
contrast to today’s high-cost oligopolistic market.

80

Chwee, Sim K. (2007). UK-Singapore open skies opens new markets. TTG Asia Online. Retrieved October 19,
2007, from www.ttgasia.com

26
Appendix
Table 1.
Freedoms of the Skies81
1st freedom.

The right of an airline of one country to fly over the territory of another
country without landing.

2nd freedom.

The right of an airline of one country to land in another country for nontraffic
reasons, such as maintenance or refueling, while en route to another country.

3rd freedom.

The right of an airline of one country to carry traffic from its country of
registry to another country.

4th freedom.

The right of an airline of one country to carry traffic from another country to
its own country of registry.

5th freedom.

The right of an airline of one country to carry traffic between two countries
outside of its own country of registry as long as the flight originates or
terminates in its own country of registry (i.e., “beyond rights”).

6th freedom.

The right of an airline of one country to carry traffic between two foreign
countries via its own country of registry. This freedom combines the third and
fourth freedoms.

7th freedom.

The right of an airline to operate stand-alone services, entirely outside of the
territory of its home state, to carry traffic between two foreign states.

8th freedom.

The right of an airline to carry traffic between two points within the territory
of a foreign state (i.e., “cabotage”).
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